![]() I can confidently answer the that-question and the what-question at the same time, and I know both things because I am the one who is consciously experiencing the mental state and its content. I am doubting about the existence of the world but not about other things. Descartes thought that I know that I am doubting but not calculating and I know what I am doubting about. This core idea can be found in Aristotle, Descartes, Brentano and Husserl but also in contemporary self-representational higher-order theories of consciousness (Kriegel, 2009 Kriegel & Williford, 2006). We usually know both things with absolute evidence or, at least, confidence. This intentional analysis leads us to distinguish in a seemingly uncontroversial way between the type of mental state we are currently in-feeling but not remembering-and its mental content, whether qualitative or conceptual-feeling cold but not hot. According to traditional intentional analysis of mental states, under normal limitations I know the kind of mental state I am in-I feel cold now but I cannot remember how cold I was yesterday-and I also know what I feel-I feel cold but not hot. If this is true, it is a challenging idea. This means that we might have them, in the sense of experiencing them, although we are not in a position to know what we are experiencing through them and even that we are experiencing them. ![]() Tim Williamson has argued that many mental states are non-luminous. ![]()
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